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Recent research suggests that prospective and non-prospective forms of mind-wandering
possess distinct properties, yet little is known about what exactly differentiates
between future-oriented and non-future-oriented mind-wandering episodes. In the present
study, we used multilevel exploratory factor analyses (MEFA) to examine the factorial
structure of various phenomenological dimensions of mind-wandering, and we then
investigated whether future-oriented mind-wandering episodes differ from other classes
of mind-wandering along the identified factors. We found that the phenomenological
dimensions of mind-wandering are structured in four factors: representational format
(inner speech vs. visual imagery), personal relevance, realism/concreteness, and
structuration. Prospective mind-wandering differed from non-prospective mind-wandering
along each of these factors. Specifically, future-oriented mind-wandering episodes
involved inner speech to a greater extent, were more personally relevant, more
realistic/concrete, and more often part of structured sequences of thoughts. These
results show that future-oriented mind-wandering possesses a unique phenomenological
signature and provide new insights into how this particular form of mind-wandering may
adaptively contribute to autobiographical planning.
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INTRODUCTION
Mind-wandering occurs when attention drifts away from the task
at hand and focuses on internally-generated thoughts that are not
directly related to the present environment, such as memories
or prospective thoughts (Singer, 1993; Smallwood and Schooler,
2006; Schooler et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a,b). This phe-
nomenon is quite frequent, representing from 20 to 50 percent
of our daily thinking time (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010; Song andWang, 2012), and research has shown that
it generally impairs current task performance (Smallwood et al.,
2007; McVay and Kane, 2010; Smallwood, 2011) and is associated
with decreased processing of stimuli from the external environ-
ment (Barron et al., 2011; Braboszcz and Delorme, 2011; Kam
et al., 2011). These findings suggest that mind-wandering repre-
sents a state of decoupled attention from the external world dur-
ing which attentional resources are directed toward the processing
and maintenance of internally generated thoughts (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2010, 2013; Schooler et al., 2011;
Smallwood et al., 2012).
Although mind-wandering has recently received increased
interest in cognitive psychology and neuroscience (for recent
reviews, see Klinger, 2009; Christoff et al., 2011; Smallwood,
2011; Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Christoff, 2012; Fell, 2012; Kane
and McVay, 2012; Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013), there is
surprisingly little data on the content and phenomenological fea-
tures of mind-wandering episodes. A few studies have explored
some phenomenological characteristics of mind-wandering but,
for most of them, these research exclusively focused on a sin-
gle dimension, such as the representational format of thoughts
(Antrobus et al., 1966, 1970), their affective valence (Marchetti
et al., 2012), the spontaneous nature of their occurrence
(Giambra, 1995; Forster and Lavie, 2009), or their structura-
tion in complex sequences (Teasdale et al., 1993; Stuyven
and Van Der Goten, 1995). Other studies have shown that
most mind-wandering episodes are oriented toward the future
(Smallwood et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a; Song and
Wang, 2012), and that these future-oriented mind-wandering
episodes are mostly self-related and goal-directed—they mainly
involve autobiographical planning (Stawarczyk et al., 2011a;
Song and Wang, 2012)—whereas the goal-directedness of past-
oriented mind-wandering is much less marked (Baird et al.,
2011). The evidence further suggests that prospective mind-
wandering might possess specific properties. For instance, it
has been shown that the frequency of future-oriented mind-
wandering is specifically increased by previous reflections upon
one’s personal goals (Stawarczyk et al., 2011a) and self-related
traits (Smallwood et al., 2011), whereas the frequency of
past-oriented mind-wandering remains unchanged. In addi-
tion, some studies have shown that prospective mind-wandering
makes more demands on processing resources than non-
future-oriented mind-wandering: with increasing task demands,
future-oriented mind-wandering decreases to a larger extent than
past-oriented mind-wandering (Smallwood et al., 2009), and
individuals with higher working memory capacity report more
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future-oriented mind-wandering episodes but not more past- or
present-oriented episodes during relatively undemanding tasks
(Baird et al., 2011).
Current evidence thus suggests that different types of mind-
wandering episodes possess distinct properties and, in par-
ticular, that prospective mind-wandering differs from other
forms of mind-wandering. Little is known, however, about what
exactly differentiates prospective from non-prospective forms
of mind-wandering. Studies of “directed” future thinking (i.e.,
studies in which the participants are explicitly instructed to
form mental representations of the future) have shown that
prospective thoughts differ from past thoughts along several
phenomenological features, including levels of sensory details
(D’Argembeau and Van Der Linden, 2004, 2006), emotional
valence (Macleod and Byrne, 1996; D’Argembeau and Van Der
Linden, 2006; Rasmussen and Berntsen, 2013), and personal rel-
evance (D’Argembeau and Van Der Linden, 2006; Addis et al.,
2008; Berntsen and Bohn, 2010). Whether similar phenomeno-
logical differences characterize prospective and non-prospective
forms of mind-wandering is currently unknown. The phe-
nomenological qualities of mental representations play important
roles in determining one’s conviction (accurate or not) that they
are tied to reality (Johnson, 1988), which in turn may influ-
ence decision making and behavior (Johnson and Sherman,
1990; Roese and Sherman, 2007). From this perspective, a bet-
ter understanding of the phenomenological structure of mind-
wandering, and of how various forms of mind-wandering dif-
fer along important phenomenological dimensions, may pro-
vide important insight into the beneficial and deleterious effects
of mind-wandering episodes (for a recent review on the costs
and benefits of mind-wandering, see Mooneyham and Schooler,
2013).
To seek insight into these questions, the current study sam-
pled the occurrence and content of mind-wandering episodes
with thought-probes during the Sustained Attention to Response
Task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997). After the SART, participants
were asked to rate each reported mind-wandering episode on
various phenomenological dimensions that could potentially dif-
ferentiate a range of mind-wandering episodes, including their
representational format (Antrobus et al., 1970; Klinger and Cox,
1987; Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008; Delamillieure et al., 2010;
Song and Wang, 2012), structuration and intentional aspect
(Teasdale et al., 1993; Giambra, 1995; Stuyven and Van Der
Goten, 1995; Forster and Lavie, 2009), repetitiveness, abstract-
ness, and emotional valence (Watkins, 2008, 2010), and links
with personal goals and concerns (Klinger, 1978, 1999, 2009;
Klinger et al., 1980; Gold and Reilly, 1985). These phenomeno-
logical ratings were submitted to an exploratory multilevel factor
analysis in order to determine the factorial structure of mind-
wandering characteristics both at the within-participant and
between-participant levels (Muthén, 1994; Reise et al., 2005).
We then compared future-oriented mind-wandering episodes
with non-future-oriented mind-wandering episodes along the
dimensional factors revealed by the multilevel factor analysis.
Additionally, we explored whether the features of future-oriented




A total of 67 participants (32 men) from the Belgian general pop-
ulation volunteered to participate in the study. Their age ranged
from 18 to 30 years with a mean age of 23.28 years (SD = 2.08).
Individuals with medical, neurological, or psychiatric disorders
were excluded from the study. This study was part of a broader
research project that was approved by the Ethical Committee of
the faculty of Psychology and Education of theUniversity of Liège.
All participants provided written informed consent.
TASK AND QUESTIONNAIRES
SART with thought-probes
Participants completed a version of the SART with thought-
probes adapted from Stawarczyk et al. (2011a). Stimuli (numbers
between 1 and 9) were presented sequentially at the center of
the screen. Participants were asked to respond as fast and accu-
rately as possible to the numbers and to withhold their response
when presented with the number 3 (the target stimulus). The
probability of the target stimulus was 11%. The interstimulus
interval was 2000ms, and the duration of each stimulus was
500ms. The task comprised 30 blocks whose duration was either
25, 35, 45, 55, or 65 s. Six blocks of each length were presented
in a predetermined pseudorandom order. Across the 30 blocks,
540 numbers (both targets and non-targets) were presented for
a total duration of 22min and 30 s. Each block was immedi-
ately followed by a thought-probe which interrupted the task.
For each of these interruptions, a question appeared on the
screen asking participants whether they had been experiencing
mind-wandering episodes since the last interruption (or since the
beginning of the task for the first interruption). Participants were
explained in details that mind-wandering episodes specifically
referred to stimulus-independent and task-unrelated thoughts
and thus other experiences were excluded from this category,
including thoughts related to the appraisal of the task (i.e., task-
related interferences) and distractions by currently experienced
exteroceptive perceptions and interoceptive sensations (i.e., exter-
nal distractions; see Stawarczyk et al., 2011a). After responding to
each probe with a key press (“o” for yes or “n” for no), a short text
was displayed on the screen which asked participants to press the
response key (the spacebar) to continue the task. When the par-
ticipants gave a positive answer to the thought-probes, the text
display furthermore reminded them to write a brief description
of all the mind-wandering episodes they had experienced since
the last interruption. Participants were told that their descriptions
should be detailed enough to allow them to clearly remember
after the task what they had thought about during each mind-
wandering episode. No mention was made about the Thought
Characteristics Questionnaire at this stage. Before beginning the
SART, participants performed a short training session of the task
and were given a written summary of the instructions to help
them in case of doubt when responding to the thought-probes.
Thought characteristics questionnaire (TCQ)
The content and characteristics of each mind-wandering
episode reported during the SART were assessed with a self-
report questionnaire adapted from the Memory Characteristics
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Questionnaire created by Johnson et al. (1988) and previ-
ously used in Stawarczyk et al. (2011a). For each mind-
wandering episode, the following phenomenological dimensions
were assessed with seven-point Likert scales: (1) the thought
involved visual imagery (1 = not at all, 7 = totally), (2)
the thought involved inner speech (1 = not at all, 7 = totally),
(3) the occurrence of the thought was intended and intentional
(i.e., the participant intentionally decided to think of something
else than the SART; 1 = not at all, 7 = totally), (4) the thought
belonged to a structured succession of thoughts (such as in rea-
soning, reflection or argumentation; 1 = not at all, 7 = totally),
(5) the content of the thought was realistic and plausible (1= not
at all, 7 = totally), (6) the content of the thought was related to
something concrete and well-defined (e.g., a precise situation or
a particular action; 1 = not at all, 7 = totally), (7) the content
of the thought was of importance to the participant’s life (1 =
not at all, 7 = totally), (8) the content of the thought was related
to the participant’s personal goals (1 = not at all, 7 = totally),
(9) the thought often comes to the participant’s mind in daily life
(1 = never, 7 = very often), and (10) the affective valence of the
thought’s content (−3= very negative, +3= very positive).
In addition to these phenomenological dimensions, partic-
ipants were also asked to characterize each mind-wandering
episode according to its temporal orientation by choosing
between: (1) past, (2) present, (3) future or (4) no precise tem-
poral orientation. For past and future mind-wandering episodes,
participants were also asked to specify the temporal distance of
their thoughts by choosing between six different categories: (1)
before/later in the present day, (2) between yesterday/tomorrow
and the past/next 7 days, (3) between 1 week and 1 month in the
past/future, (4) between 1 month and 1 year in the past/future,
(5) more than 1 year away in the past/future and (6) no pre-
cise temporal distance. Finally, subjects were asked to specify the
main function of each thought by choosing between: (1) to make
a decision/solve a problem, (2) to plan something, (3) to reap-
praise a situation, (4) to make the participant feel better, (5) to
keep the participant aroused, (6) another non-listed function (in
which case, participants were asked to specify what the function
was), and (7) daydream with no apparent function.
RESULTS
SART PERFORMANCES AND THOUGHT-PROBE RESPONSES
The mean proportion of correct responses to the target stimuli
was 66.57% (SD = 18.16), the mean reaction time (RT) to the
non-targets was 348ms (SD = 41), and the mean coefficient of
variation (CV; the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean)
of RTs for the non-targets was 20.63 (SD = 5.23). Participants
reported having experienced mind-wandering episodes for a
mean of 30.60% of the thought-probes (SD = 19.11; range =
3.33–86.67%), with amean of 11.04 reported thoughts per partic-
ipants (SD = 7.94; range = 1–39). In total, 740 mind-wandering
episodes were reported across participants and had their content
and characteristics evaluated on the TCQ.
Analyses of SART performance according to the responses
given to the thought probes revealed that response accuracy to
the targets was lower [t(66) = 2.51; p = 0.01; noMW= 68.01%±
19.45; MW= 61.52%± 23.75], RT for the non-targets was slower
[t(66) = −3.56; p < 0.001; noMW= 346ms± 40;MW= 353ms
± 45], and CV for the non-target was larger [t(66) = −3.12; p <
0.01; noMW= 20.10± 5.15; MW= 21.67± 6.22] when the par-
ticipants reported having experienced mind-wandering. Across
the entire task, there was a negative correlation between reported
mind-wandering episodes and target accuracy (r = −0.30; p =
0.01), as well as a positive correlation between mind-wandering
and CV of RTs for non-targets (r = 0.37; p = 0.002). The corre-
lation between mind-wandering episodes and mean RTs was not
significant (r = 0.09; p = 0.45). Together, these findings repli-
cate those of previous studies (McVay and Kane, 2009; Stawarczyk
et al., 2011a; McVay and Kane, 2012) and demonstrate the valid-
ity of the subjective reports of mind-wandering made by the
participants in the present research.
PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND-WANDERING EPISODES
Descriptive statistics of the TCQ dimensions
We first present descriptive statistics for the various phenomeno-
logical dimensions of the TCQ. The mean scores and stan-
dard deviation for each TCQ dimension calculated for the 740
mind-wandering episodes across all participants are presented
in Figure 1. These descriptive statistics show that, on average,
mind-wandering episodes involved a moderate amount of visual
imagery and inner speech, and that, for the most part, they did
not belong to a structured sequence of thoughts and their occur-
rence was not intended. Furthermore, mind-wandering content
was mostly realistic and concrete, moderately important, and
not necessarily strongly related to the participants’ personal goals
(although there was substantial variability in this respect). Finally,
most of the reported mind-wandering episodes did not involve
thoughts that occur repetitively, and their affective content was
neutral, although showing a slight positive bias. Together, these
results largely replicate those of a previous study that also used
FIGURE 1 | Descriptive statistics of the TCQ dimensions. Note: all
dimensions were rated on scales ranging from 1 to 7 except the affective
valence scale which ranged from −3 to +3. Bars represent the standard
deviation of the mean.
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the TCQ to assess the phenomenological dimensions of mind-
wandering (Stawarczyk et al., 2011a).
Multilevel factor analyses of the TCQ dimensions
Next, we sought to investigate the internal structure of mind-
wandering phenomenology, that is, the functional dependencies
and independence among the various dimensions investigated in
this study. Specifically, we examined whether some of the phe-
nomenological dimensions ofmind-wandering are related to each
other at the intra-individual level (i.e., whether the scores on
some dimensions tend to vary together within participants) and
at the inter-individual level (i.e., whether participants with higher
scores on one dimension tend to have higher scores on some
other dimensions). To investigate these two issues, the data from
the 740mind-wandering episodes (which are nested within the
67 participants) were submitted to a multilevel exploratory fac-
tor analysis (MEFA; Muthén, 1994; Reise et al., 2005) computed
with Mplus 6.11 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2010). MEFA sep-
arately provides the factor structure of the data at the within-
and between-individual levels, and is performed in a succession
of steps that are described below.
The first step is to examine the intraclass correlation (ICC) for
each measured item in order to determine whether the MEFA
is necessary. The ICC estimates the amount of the total item
variance that is due to between-individual variance. ICC varies
between zero and one; an ICC of zero indicates that all the varia-
tion is within individuals, whereas an ICC of one indicates that
all the variation is between individuals. It has been suggested
that MEFA are required to properly examine the factor structure
of nested data when the ICC of the items is above 0.05 (Reise
et al., 2005). The ICC results for the present data are provided
in Table 1 and show that approximately between 20% and 40% of
the item variance is between individuals, confirming the necessity
of MEFA to properly analyze the data in the present study.
The next step of MEFA is to partition the total correlation
matrix into within and between components. The precise statisti-
cal methods to obtain these components are detailed elsewhere
(Muthén, 1994; D’Haenens et al., 2010) and the two resulting
matrices should be interpreted as follows: if two variables are
highly correlated in the between (inter-individual) correlation
matrix, this indicates that people who are, on average, high on one
variable also tend to be high, on average, on the other variable. On
the other hand, if two variables are highly correlated in the within
(intra-individual) matrix, this indicates that higher scores (rela-
tive to a person’s mean) on the first variable tend to co-occur with
higher scores (relative to a person’s mean) on the second variable
within individuals (Reise et al., 2005). The within and between
correlation matrices for the present data are shown in Table 1.
Finally, the last step of MEFA is to conduct ordinary factor
analyses for each correlation matrix separately. The maximum
likelihood EFA performed on the within correlations matrix
revealed four factors with eigenvalues above one (respectively,
2.81, 1.51, 1.32, and 1.04; the scree plot is presented in Figure 2),
explaining 66.8% of the variance. The resulting four-component
Table 1 | Within and between correlation matrices, and intraclass correlations for TCQ items.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATED SIGMA WITHIN CORRELATION MATRIX
1. Visual 1
2. Speech −0.55 1
3. Intended −0.08 0.19 1
4. Structured −0.19 0.33 0.19 1
5. Realistic −0.05 0.10 0.04 0.07 1
6. Concrete −0.03 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.52 1
7. Important −0.14 0.26 0.08 0.19 0.27 0.14 1
8. Goals −0.24 0.34 0.08 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.61 1
9. Repetitive −0.15 0.25 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.57 0.52 1
10. Affective 0.18 −0.16 −0.01 −0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 −0.02 −0.08 1
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATED SIGMA BETWEEN CORRELATION MATRIX
1. Visual 1
2. Speech −0.22 1
3. Intended 0.38 −0.30 1
4. Structured 0.52 0.005 0.25 1
5. Realistic 0.02 0.25 −0.32 0.13 1
6. Concrete 0.09 0.21 −0.24 −0.08 0.60 1
7. Important 0.01 0.26 −0.34 0.22 −0.20 −0.14 1
8. Goals −0.05 0.23 −0.06 0.12 −0.12 −0.29 0.74 1
9. Repetitive 0.27 0.16 0.05 0.36 −0.39 −0.22 0.84 0.79 1
10. Affective 0.35 −0.11 0.27 0.41 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.14 1
INTRACLASS CORRELATION
0.22 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.33
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solution using an Oblimin (oblique) rotation is presented in
Table 2 with the individual component loading for each variable
included, as well as the correlations between the factors. We used
a rotation that allows the factors to be correlated to avoid the dis-
tortions that can occur by forcing an orthogonal rotation onto
the data (Reise et al., 2005). The first factor corresponded to the
representational format of the thoughts, with dimensions with
the strongest loading being, in opposite directions, visual imagery
and inner speech. The second factor can be interpreted as reflect-
ing the personal relevance of the thought, with dimensions that
loaded most heavily on this factor being the “importance of the
FIGURE 2 | Scree-plot for the multilevel exploratory factor analysis.
Note: eigenvalues for the MEFA performed at the within- and
between-participant level.
Table 2 | Pattern matrix indicating loadings of the TCQ items on the
four factors identified at the within (intra-individual) level and
correlations between the factors.
TCQ items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
ROTATED LOADINGS
1. Visual −0.747 0.026 0.001 0.096
2. Speech 0.724 0.060 0.025 0.153
3. Intended 0.070 0.006 0.009 0.327
4. Structured 0.178 0.094 −0.017 0.409
5. Realistic 0.006 0.102 0.718 −0.089
6. Concrete 0.008 −0.080 0.742 0.070
7. Important −0.077 0.839 0.048 0.051
8. Goals 0.117 0.683 0.047 0.029
9. Repetitive 0.048 0.724 −0.093 −0.088
10. Affective −0.320 0.065 0.057 0.159
FACTOR CORRELATIONS
Factor 1 1
Factor 2 0.349 1
Factor 3 0.101 0.254 1
Factor 4 0.304 0.180 0.204 1
Factor loadings exceeding 0.4 are highlighted in bold.
thought’s content,” “relationship of the thought’s content with
the participant’s personal goals,” and “repetitive occurrence of
the thought in the participant’s daily life.” The third factor cor-
responded to the realistic and concrete character of the thought’s
content. Finally, the dimension that loaded into Factor 4 was the
structured aspect of the thought (i.e., whether it was part of a rea-
soning process or a structured succession of thoughts). Although
the affective valence and intentional dimension of the thoughts
showed moderate loadings on Factor 1 and Factor 4 respectively,
their loadings were weaker than those of other variables. The four
factors were only weakly or moderately correlated to each other
(see Table 2).
The maximum likelihood EFA performed on the between cor-
relations matrix revealed three factors with eigenvalues above
one (respectively, 3.00, 2.21, and 1.82; the scree plot is pre-
sented in Figure 2), explaining 70.3% of the variance. The
resulting three-component solution using an Oblimin (oblique)
rotation is presented in Table 3 with the individual compo-
nent loading for each variable included, as well as the corre-
lations between the factors. The dimensions that loaded onto
Factor 1 were visual imagery, affective valence, and the inten-
tional and structured aspect of the thoughts. The second factor
was similar as for the within-individual analysis and reflected
the personal relevance of the thoughts, with dimensions that
loaded most strongly being the “importance of the thought’s
content,” “relationship of the thought’s content with the partic-
ipant’s personal goals,” and “repetitive occurrence of the thought
in the participant’s daily life.” The third factor was also sim-
ilar as for the within-individual analysis and corresponded to
the realistic and concrete character of the thought’s content.
Inner speech was not specifically related to any of the three fac-
tors. The correlations between the three between-factors were
negligible.
Table 3 | Pattern matrix indicating loadings of the TCQ items on the
three factors identified at the between (inter-individual) level and
correlations between the factors.
TCQ items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
ROTATED LOADINGS
1. Visual 0.802 0.068 0.107
2. Speech −0.251 0.295 0.307
3. Intended 0.586 −0.326 −0.398
4. Structured 0.640 0.249 0.234
5. Realistic 0.077 −0.121 0.962
6. Concrete 0.052 −0.046 0.613
7. Important −0.121 0.947 0.055
8. Goals −0.060 0.817 −0.029
9. Repetitive 0.249 0.926 −0.192
10. Affective 0.440 0.052 0.081
FACTOR CORRELATIONS
Factor 1 1
Factor 2 0.072 1
Factor 3 −0.128 −0.133 1
Factor loadings exceeding 0.4 are highlighted in bold.
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Characterization of future-orientedmind-wandering along the
factorial dimensions
The preceding within-participant factor analysis shows that the
phenomenology of individual mind-wandering episodes can be
characterized along four key dimensions that correspond to the
representational format of the thought, its personal relevance,
realistic/concrete character, and structuration. Next, we examined
whether these four dimensions vary as a function of the tem-
poral orientation and perceived functions of reported thoughts.
The distribution of the mind-wandering episodes according to
their temporal orientation is presented in Figure 3A. As we
were interested in determining whether and how future-oriented
mind-wandering episodes differ from those with other tempo-
ral orientations, the 740mind-wandering episodes were pooled
into two categories (future-oriented vs. non-future-oriented) for
subsequent analyses 1. With regard to perceived functions, the
distribution of the mind-wandering episodes according to their
attributed function is detailed in Figure 3B. Our interest here was
1Although our main interest in this study was to compare future-oriented
with non-future-oriented mind wandering episodes, it would have also been
interesting to investigate whether the three types of non-future-oriented
episodes (i.e., episodes referring to the past, the present, or with no pre-
cise temporal orientation) differ from each other. However, only 25 out
of the 67 participants in this study reported at least one episode for each
of these categories. Given this loss of statistical power, we decided to only
present the analyses on the pooled data for the non-future mind-wandering
categories. We nonetheless performed additional analyses that specifically
contrasted future- vs. past-oriented mind-wandering episodes. These anal-
yses were conducted on 454mind-wandering episodes nested within the 46
participants who reported at least one future-oriented and one past-oriented
mind-wandering episode. The results of these analyses were for the most part
the same as those obtained when comparing future-oriented mind-wandering
with the pooled non-future category. The only difference was that future-
oriented episodes were not significantly more structured than past-oriented
episodes (coefficient = −0.17; SE = 0.17; p = 0.32; Future = 3.04 ± 1.73,
Past = 2.99± 1.86).
in distinguishing between future- and goal-oriented functions
(i.e., to make a decision/solve a problem, to plan something, and
to reappraise a situation) and functions that are not particularly
future-oriented or goal-directed (i.e., to try to feel better, to keep
oneself aroused, daydreams with no function or other, non-listed
functions) and, therefore, the 740 mind-wandering episodes were
pooled into these two categories (i.e., future-oriented functions
vs. non-future-oriented functions) for subsequent analyses. The
distribution of these two categories of functions according to the
temporal orientation of mind-wandering episodes is presented in
Figure 4.
For each mind-wandering episode, the dimensions that char-
acterized each of the four factors identified in the within-
participant MEFA (i.e., dimensions with coefficients>0.50 in the
within correlation matrix and that loaded onto the same factor
of the within level of the MEFA) were aggregated into a single
score (for the index of representational format, scores on the inner
speech items were first reversed, as they correlated negatively with
scores on visual imagery). The two dimensions that did not load
on any of the four factors (i.e., affective valence and intentional
character) were analyzed separately. The proportion of the total
variance that was due to within-participant differences (i.e., vari-
ation among thoughts) was 81, 94, 81, 88, 73, and 91% for rep-
resentational format, personal relevance, realism/concreteness,
structuration, intention, and affect, respectively. To examine
whether each phenomenological dimension differed as a function
of temporal orientation, we fitted a random intercept multi-
level model (using MLwiN; Rasbash et al., 2009) with the index
of the phenomenological dimension as dependent variable and
temporal orientation (coded as a dummy variable with 0 =
future-oriented and 1 = non-future-oriented) as an explanatory
variable. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 4. A like-
lihood ratio (LR) test indicated a significant effect of temporal
orientation for representational format, showing that future-
oriented thoughts involved less visual imagery/more inner speech
FIGURE 3 | Distribution of mind-wandering episodes. Note:
Panels (A) and (B) respectively represent the distribution of the 740
mind-wandering episodes according to their temporal orientation and
attributed function; reap. = reappraising a situation; panel (A) shows
the expected prospective bias of mind-wandering and panel (B)
reveals that planning was the function most commonly attributed to
mind-wandering, although a substantial part of episodes were
perceived as not possessing any particular function.
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FIGURE 4 | Distribution of future and non-future functions
according to the temporal orientation of mind wandering
episodes. Note: future- and goal-oriented functions were mostly
attributed to temporally future-oriented mind-wandering episodes rather
than to episodes with other temporal orientation or no precise
temporal orientation.
Table 4 | Effects of temporal orientation (future vs. non-future) on the phenomenological dimensions of mind-wandering.
Phenomenological dimension Future Non-future Coefficient LR (1 d.f.) p
M SD M SD
Representational format 3.48 1.55 4.88 1.79 1.24 (0.12) 95 <0.001
Personal relevance 4.12 1.51 2.87 1.56 −1.29 (0.12) 113 <0.001
Realism/concreteness 6.07 1.12 5.41 1.57 −0.66 (0.10) 41 <0.001
Structured 3.00 1.78 2.75 1.79 −0.29 (0.13) 4.66 0.03
Intended 2.37 1.49 2.09 1.39 −0.35 (0.10) 12 <0.001
Affect 0.57 1.51 0.46 1.52 −0.15 (0.11) 1.65 0.20
The coefficients represent contrasts with the reference category (the future orientation); standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
than non-future-oriented thoughts2. The effect of temporal ori-
entation was also significant for the index of personal relevance,
the realistic and concrete character of thoughts, their structured
aspect, and intentional dimension: future-oriented thoughts
were more self-relevant, more realistic/concrete, more struc-
tured, and more intentional than non-future-oriented thoughts.
For affective valence, the effect of temporal orientation was not
significant.
Similar multilevel analyses were performed to investigate
the influence of perceived functions on each phenomenological
dimension of the 740 mind-wandering episodes. The results of
these analyses are shown in Table 5. Mind-wandering episodes
with future-oriented and goal-directed functions involved less
visual imagery/more inner speech thanmind-wandering episodes
with non-future-oriented functions. The effect of perceived
function was also significant for personal relevance, real-
ism/concreteness, structuration, and intention, with each of these
dimensions being higher for thoughts with future-oriented func-
tions. Lastly, there was a significant effect of perceived function
on affective valence, showing that thoughts with non-future-
oriented functions were judged as being more positive than
2For completeness, we also examined each of these two dimensions individ-
ually. These analyses showed that future-oriented mind-wandering episodes
involved both more inner speech [Coeff. = −1.40 (0.14); LR = 94.51; p <
0.001; Future = 4.58 ± 1.89; Non-future = 3.04 ± 2] and less visual
imagery [Coeff. = 1.06 (0.15); LR = 50.33; p < 0.001; Future = 3.55 ± 1.91,
Non-future= 4.80± 2.17] than non-future-oriented episodes.
thoughts with future-oriented functions; it should be noted, how-
ever, that both kinds of thoughts were, on average, quite neutral
(i.e., close to the middle point of the scale).
Finally, we examined whether the phenomenological dimen-
sions of future-oriented mind-wandering episodes differed as a
function of their temporal distance. The distribution of the 312
future- and 195 past-oriented mind-wandering episodes accord-
ing to their temporal distance is presented in Figure 5. To analyze
the effect of temporal distance for the future-oriented episodes,
the data were pooled into two categories to have a sufficient num-
ber of thoughts per category: close future (combining thoughts
referring to the same day and thoughts referring to a time between
tomorrow and the next 7 days) and distant future (combin-
ing all other temporal distance categories, except the no precise
temporal location category which was excluded from the anal-
yses). Multilevel analyses (see Table 6) with each phenomeno-
logical dimension as dependent variable and temporal distance
(coded as a dummy variable with 0 = close future and 1 = dis-
tant future) as predictor variable showed that mind-wandering
episodes referring to the distant future were more self-relevant,
more structured, and less concrete/realistic thanmind-wandering
episodes referring to the close future; temporal distance did not
significantly influence the representational format, intentional
character, and affective valence of thoughts.
DISCUSSION
Our aims in this study were to characterize the factorial structure
of various phenomenological characteristics of mind-wandering
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Table 5 | Effects of perceived function (future-oriented vs. non-future-oriented) on the phenomenological dimensions of mind-wandering.
Phenomenological dimension Future functions Non-future functions Coefficient LR (1 d.f.) p
M SD M SD
Representational format 3.53 1.66 4.92 1.72 1.33 (0.12) 116 <0.001
Personal relevance 4.18 1.49 2.75 1.50 −1.47 (0.11) 159 <0.001
Realism/concreteness 6.02 1.15 5.41 1.58 −0.68 (0.10) 46 <0.001
Structured 3.13 1.81 2.63 1.75 −0.54 (0.13) 17 <0.001
Intended 2.33 1.44 2.10 1.43 −0.34 (0.10) 12 <0.001
Affect 0.22 1.58 0.74 1.41 0.48 (0.11) 19 <0.001
The coefficients represent contrasts with the reference category (future-oriented functions); standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
FIGURE 5 | Temporal distance of mind-wandering episodes according
to their temporal orientation. Note: most future-oriented
mind-wandering episodes were related to the close future (later today
or in the next 7 days) whereas past-oriented episodes were more
equally distributed across the different temporal distances; day =
before/later in the present day; week = between yesterday/tomorrow
and the past/next 7 days; month = between 1 week and 1 month in
the past/future; year = between 1 month and 1 year in the
past/future; year + = more than 1 year away in the past/future;
none = no precise temporal distance.
Table 6 | Effects of temporal distance (close future vs. far future) on the phenomenological dimensions of future-oriented mind-wandering.
Phenomenological dimension Close future Far future Coefficient LR (1 d.f.) p
M SD M SD
Representational format 3.43 1.57 3.51 1.54 0.03 (0.19) 0.03 0.86
Personal relevance 3.85 1.41 4.62 1.58 0.77 (0.18) 18 <0.001
Realism/concreteness 6.27 0.94 5.74 1.27 −0.53 (0.12) 19 <0.001
Structured 2.81 1.67 3.33 1.96 0.61 (0.20) 8.90 0.003
Intended 2.43 1.61 2.23 1.22 −0.25 (0.17) 2.24 0.13
Affect 0.57 1.39 0.66 1.67 0.06 (0.18) 0.12 0.73
The coefficients represent contrasts with the reference category (close future); standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
that had been investigated in previous studies (Antrobus et al.,
1970; Teasdale et al., 1993; Giambra, 1995; Stuyven and Van
Der Goten, 1995; Forster and Lavie, 2009; Marchetti et al.,
2012; Song and Wang, 2012) and to determine whether future-
oriented mind-wandering episodes differ from other classes of
mind-wandering along the identified factorial dimensions.
The MEFA allowed us to determine the factorial struc-
ture of mind-wandering episodes at both the within- and
between-participant levels. At the within-participant level, the
phenomenological features of mind-wandering were structured
in four factors. The first factor corresponded to the represen-
tational format of the reported thoughts. Inner speech and
visual imagery are two fundamental dimensions of inner expe-
rience (Klinger and Cox, 1987; Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008;
Delamillieure et al., 2010), and the present results showed that
these two dimensions were negatively correlated with each other,
indicating that mind-wandering episodes usually involved only
a single type of representational format. The second factor
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corresponded to the personal significance of the mind-wandering
episode, with high factor loadings for personal importance, rela-
tionship with personal goals, and frequency of occurrence in
daily life; this finding provides support to the view that per-
sonal goals and concerns that manifest repeatedly in daily life
are important determinants of mind-wandering (Klinger, 1978;
Klinger et al., 1980; Gold and Reilly, 1985). The third factor indi-
cated that mind-wandering episodes differed in their realism and
concreteness, and the fourth and final factor corresponded to
the structuration of mind-wandering episodes in sequences of
thoughts; similar dimensions have been reported to characterize
the phenomenology of thought flow in daily life (Klinger andCox,
1987; Klinger, 2009).
At the between-participant level, the phenomenological fea-
tures of mind-wandering were structured in three factors, with
two of them (personal relevance and realism/concreteness) being
identical to those found at the within-participant level. Thus,
the dimensions constituting each of these two factors tended
to vary together both within participants (e.g., thoughts scored
higher on one dimension of personal relevance relative to the
person’s mean tend to be scored higher on the other dimen-
sions of this factor) and between participants (e.g., individuals
with higher mean scores on one dimension of personal relevance
tend to possess higher mean scores on the others dimensions of
this factor). On the other hand, the third factor of the between
analysis was not superimposable to any of the factors identi-
fied in the within analysis; it was characterized by high factor
loadings for visual imagery, affective valence, and the inten-
tional and structured aspects of mind-wandering episodes. Thus,
whereas when taken individually mind-wandering episodes usu-
ally involved only a single type of representational format (cf. the
results at the within-participants level), we did not find between-
participant differences indicating a tendency to experience exclu-
sively visual vs. verbal mind-wandering episodes. Instead, indi-
vidual differences in the propensity to experience highly visual
mind-wandering in the between analysis were associated with the
voluntary engagement in structured mind-wandering episodes
that aremore positively valenced. Although further studies should
be conducted to determine the exact nature and implications of
this individual difference factor (e.g., by examining its relation-
ships with measures of individual differences such as personality
traits, mood states or attentional control abilities), this find-
ing nonetheless demonstrates the importance of distinguishing
between within- and between-subject levels for characterizing
the phenomenological structure of mind-wandering. This may
have important implications for studies that attempt to deter-
mine the neural substrates of subjective experience during mind-
wandering and the so-called “resting state” (Buckner et al., 2008;
Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011b). Indeed, there has
been a growing interest in using functional neuroimaging tech-
niques to link subjective experience to patterns of brain activity
(i.e., a neurophenomenological approach; Lutz and Thompson,
2003; Rudrauf et al., 2003) but, to date, most studies have investi-
gated variations between participants (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010; Doucet et al., 2012). Our findings suggest that linking brain
activity to phenomenological features at the within-participant
level might provide important additional information.
Having identified the factorial structure of the phenomeno-
logical dimensions of mind-wandering at the within-participant
level, we then investigated whether prospective mind-wandering
episodes differ from other classes of mind-wandering episodes
along the identified factors. We found that mind-wandering
episodes that were temporally and functionally oriented toward
the future involved more inner speech and less visual imagery
than non-future-oriented mind-wandering episodes, and were
more self-relevant, realistic/concrete, intentional, and part of
structured sequences of thoughts. These findings provide novel
evidence that prospective mind-wandering possesses a unique
phenomenological signature. In terms of representational for-
mat, the lower involvement of visual imagery in future-oriented
mind-wandering is in line with previous studies on directed
future thinking, which have shown that future thoughts gener-
ally contain fewer sensory details (including visual details) than
past thoughts (D’Argembeau and Van Der Linden, 2004, 2006;
Berntsen and Bohn, 2010). On the other hand, inner speech
seems a privileged modality for the expression of prospective
mind-wandering. Evidence from thought-sampling studies sug-
gests that inner speech plays an important role in planning,
problem solving, and self-regulation (D’Argembeau et al., 2011;
Morin et al., 2011). For instance, Morin et al. (2011) found that
planning was by far the most frequent self-reported function of
inner speech, and D’Argembeau et al. (2011) found that future-
oriented thoughts involved in planning and decision making were
frequently in the form of inner speech. The current finding that
mind-wandering episodes with future-oriented functions (i.e., to
make a decision/solve a problem, to plan something, and to reap-
praise a situation) involved inner speech to a greater extent than
non-future-oriented thoughts provides additional evidence for
the central role of inner speech in autobiographical planning. Of
course, this does not exclude the fact that visual imagery also plays
an important role, allowing the construction of detailed simu-
lations of what it would be like to be in specific future events
(D’Argembeau andVanDer Linden, 2006). Identifying the precise
determinants of the use of different modalities for representing
possible futures is an important avenue for future research.
Our finding that prospective mind-wandering episodes
were more self-relevant than non-prospective forms of mind-
wandering is also in line with studies on directed future thinking
(D’Argembeau and Van Der Linden, 2006; Addis et al., 2008;
Berntsen and Bohn, 2010) and provides support for the view that
an important function of mind-wandering is to enable the antic-
ipation and planning of personally relevant future goals (Baird
et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a). On the other hand, the
finding that future-oriented mind-wandering episodes were per-
ceived as more realistic and concrete than other kinds of episodes
may, at first sight, seem contradictory to previous research on
future thinking. Several studies have indeed found that men-
tal representations of future events are usually more vague and
are guided by general life scripts to a larger extent than mem-
ories of past events (D’Argembeau and Van Der Linden, 2004,
2006; Berntsen and Bohn, 2010). It is important to note, how-
ever, that the future- and past-oriented mind-wandering episodes
that were collected in the current study were not matched to each
other in terms of temporal distance: only 3% of future-oriented
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mind-wandering episodes involved a time period more than 1
year away, compared to 31% for past-oriented mind-wandering.
Therefore, given that past and future events are represented more
abstractly with increasing temporal distance (D’Argembeau and
Van Der Linden, 2004; Addis et al., 2008; Liberman and Trope,
2008; D’Argembeau et al., 2011), it could simply be that the
higher realism/concreteness of future-oriented mind-wandering
episodes resulted from the effect of temporal distance; indeed,
in the present study, we found that mind-wandering episodes
referring to the distant future were less concrete/realistic than
mind-wandering episodes referring to the close future. Be that
as it may, the subjective experience of realism associated with
imagined prospects may play an important role in determin-
ing the impact of mind-wandering episodes on one’s decisions
and behavior (Johnson and Sherman, 1990; Roese and Sherman,
2007).
Interestingly, we also found that future-oriented mind-
wandering episodes were more structured and intended than
the other classes of mind-wandering. This might be related to
the fact that prospective mind-wandering frequently involves
autobiographical planning (Baird et al., 2011). Thinking about
ways of approaching and realizing personal goals often involves
simulating a sequence of successive interdependent events and
actions that are causally linked to each other. Themore structured
and intended nature of future-oriented mind-wandering episodes
might reflect such autobiographical planning processes. These
dimensions might also in part explain why prospective mind-
wandering makes more demands on executive resources than
non-future-oriented mind-wandering (Smallwood et al., 2009;
Baird et al., 2011). Executive control processes may indeed play
an important role in relating and coordinating envisioned pos-
sibilities in order to construct structured trains of thoughts that
can aid finding the best route for attaining personal goals (Spreng
et al., 2010; Gerlach et al., 2011).
To conclude, the present findings provide new insights as
to what differentiate prospective from non-prospective forms
of mind-wandering. In particular, our results show that future-
oriented mind-wandering episodes preferentially involve inner
speech and are more self-relevant, concrete/realistic, struc-
tured and intended than non-future-oriented mind-wandering
episodes. Taken together, these features might in part explain why
some types of mind-wandering may provide more benefits than
others (Mooneyham and Schooler, 2013). An important func-
tion of prospective mind-wanderingmight be to manage personal
goals and plan effective ways of attaining desired prospects. The
construction of structured sequences of goal-directed thoughts,
perhaps mainly via the use of inner speech, is likely an essential
ingredient of this process.
REFERENCES
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., and Schacter,
D. L. (2008). Age-related changes
in the episodic simulation of future
events. Psychol. Sci. 19, 33–41. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02043.x
Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2012). The
brain’s default network and its
adaptive role in internal menta-
tion. Neuroscientist 18, 251–270.
doi: 10.1177/1073858411403316
Andrews-Hanna, J. R., Reidler, J. S.,
Huang, C., and Buckner, R. L.
(2010). Evidence for the default net-
work’s role in spontaneous cogni-
tion. J. Neurophysiol. 104, 322–335.
doi: 10.1152/jn.00830.2009
Antrobus, J. S., Singer, J. L., Goldstein,
S., and Fortgang, M. (1970).
Mindwandering and cognitive
structure. Trans. N.Y. Acad. Sci.
32, 242–252. doi: 10.1111/j.2164-
0947.1970.tb02056.x
Antrobus, J. S., Singer, J. L., and
Greenberg, S. (1966). Studies




Motor Skills 23, 399–417. doi:
10.2466/pms.1966.23.2.399
Baird, B., Smallwood, J., and Schooler,
J. W. (2011). Back to the future:
autobiographical planning and the
functionality of mind-wandering.
Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1604–1611.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.007
Barron, E., Riby, L. M., Greer, J., and
Smallwood, J. (2011). Absorbed
in thought: the effect of mind
wandering on the processing of
relevant and irrelevant events.
Psychol. Sci. 22, 596–601. doi:
10.1177/0956797611404083
Berntsen, D., and Bohn, A. (2010).
Remembering and forecasting: the
relation between autobiographical
memory and episodic future think-
ing. Mem. Cogn. 38, 265–278. doi:
10.3758/MC.38.3.265
Braboszcz, C., and Delorme, A. (2011).
Lost in thoughts: neural markers of
low alertness during mind wander-
ing.Neuroimage 54, 3040–3047. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.10.008
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R.,
and Schacter, D. L. (2008). “The
brain’s default network: anatomy,
function, and relevance to dis-
ease,” in The Year in Cognitive
Neuroscience 2008, eds A. Kingstone
and M. B. Miller (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing), 1–38.
Christoff, K. (2012). Undirected
thought: neural determinants and
correlates. Brain Res. 1428, 51–59.
doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2011.09.060
Christoff, K., Gordon, A., and Smith,
R. (2011). “The role of sponta-
neous thought in human cogni-
tion,” in Neuroscience of Decision
Making, eds O. Vartanian and D.
R. Mandel. (Hove, NY: Psychology
Press), 259–284.
Christoff, K., Gordon, A. M.,
Smallwood, J., Schooler, J. W.,
and Smith, R. (2009). Experience
sampling during fMRI reveals
default network and executive
system contributions to mind
wandering. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 106, 8719–8724. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0900234106
D’Argembeau, A., Renaud, O., and Van
Der Linden, M. (2011). Frequency,
characteristics, and functions of
future-oriented thoughts in daily
life. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 25, 96–103.
doi: 10.1002/acp.1647
D’Argembeau, A., and Van Der Linden,
M. (2004). Phenomenal characteris-
tics associated with projecting one-
self back into the past and for-
ward into the future: influence
of valence and temporal distance.
Conscious. Cogn. 13, 844–858. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.007
D’Argembeau, A., and Van Der
Linden, M. (2006). Individual
differences in the phenomenol-
ogy of mental time travel: the
effect of vivid visual imagery and
emotion regulation strategies.
Conscious. Cogn. 15, 342–350. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.001
Delamillieure, P., Doucet, G.,
Mazoyer, B., Turbelin, M. R.,
Delcroix, N., Mellet, E., et al.
(2010). The resting state ques-
tionnaire: an introspective ques-
tionnaire for evaluation of inner
experience during the conscious
resting state. Brain Res. Bull. 81,
565–573. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres
bull.2009.11.014
D’Haenens, E., Van Damme, J., and
Onghena, P. (2010). Multilevel
exploratory factor analysis:
illustrating its surplus value in
educational effectiveness research.
School Effect. School Improve. 21,
209–235. doi: 10.1080/092434509
03581218
Doucet, G., Naveau, M., Petit, L.,
Zago, L., Crivello, F., Jobard, G.,
et al. (2012). Patterns of hemo-
dynamic low-frequency oscillations
in the brain are modulated by the
nature of free thought during rest.
Neuroimage 59, 3194–31200. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.11.059
Fell, J. (2012). I think, there-
fore I am (unhappy). Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 6:132. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2012.00132
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2009).
Harnessing the wandering mind:
the role of perceptual load.
Cognition 111, 345–355. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.006
Gerlach, K. D., Spreng, R. N.,
Gilmore, A. W., and Schacter,
D. L. (2011). Solving future
problems: default network and
executive activity associated with
goal-directed mental simulations.
Neuroimage 55, 1816–1824. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.01.030
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 425 | 10
Stawarczyk et al. Phenomenology of future-oriented mind-wandering
Giambra, L. M. (1995). A laboratory
method for investigating influences
on switching attention to task-
unrelated imagery and thought.
Conscious. Cogn. 4, 1–21. doi:
10.1006/ccog.1995.1001
Gold, S. R., and Reilly, J. P. (1985).
Daydreaming, current con-
cerns and personality. Imag.
Cogn. Pers. 5, 117–125. doi:
10.2190/BR6K-0VUW-44GC-VLA4
Heavey, C. L., and Hurlburt, R.
T. (2008). The phenomena of
inner experience. Conscious.
Cogn. Int. J. 17, 798–810. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2007.12.006
Johnson, M. K. (1988). Reality
monitoring: an experimental phe-
nomenological approach. J. Exp.
Psychol. Gen. 117, 390–394. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.117.4.390
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A.,
Suengas, A. G., and Raye, C. L.
(1988). Phenomenal character-
istics of memories for perceived
and imagined autobiographical
events. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 117,
371–376. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.
117.4.371
Johnson, M. K., and Sherman, S. J.
(1990). “Constructing and recon-
structing the past and the future
in the present,” in Handbook
of Motivation and Cognition:
Foundations of Social Behavior,
Vol. 2, eds E. T. Higgins and R. M.
Sorrentino (New York, NY: Guilford
Press), 482–526.
Kam, J. W. Y., Dao, E., Farley, J.,
Fitzpatrick, K., Smallwood, J.,
Schooler, J. W., et al. (2011). Slow
fluctuations in attentional con-
trol of sensory cortex. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 23, 460–470. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2010.21443
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay,
J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys,
I., and Kwapil, T. R. (2007). For
whom themind wanders, and when:
an experience-sampling study of
working memory and executive
control in daily life. Psychol. Sci.
18, 614–621. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01948.x
Kane, M. J., and McVay, J. C. (2012).
What mind wandering reveals
about executive-control abil-
ities and failures. Curr. Dir.
Psychol. Sci. 21, 348–354. doi:
10.1177/0963721412454875
Killingsworth, M. A., and Gilbert, D.
T. (2010). A wandering mind is an
unhappymind. Science 330:932. doi:
10.1126/science.1192439
Klinger, E. (1978). “Modes of normal
conscious flow,” in The Stream of
Consciousness, eds K. S. Pope and J.
L. Singer (New York, NY: Plenum),
225–258.
Klinger, E. (1999). “Thought flow:
properties and mechanisms under-
lying shifts in content,” in At Play
in the Fields of Consciousness, eds J.
A. Singer and P. Salovey (Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Publishers), 29–50.
Klinger, E. (2009). “Daydreaming
and fantasizing: thought flow
and motivation,” in Handbook of
Imagination and Mental Simulation,
eds K. D. Markman, W. M.
P. Klein, and J. A. Suhr (New
York, NY: Psychology Press),
225–239.
Klinger, E., Barta, S. G., and Maxeiner,
M. E. (1980). Motivational corre-
lates of thought content frequency
and commitment. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 39, 1222–1237. doi:
10.1037/h0077724
Klinger, E., and Cox, W. M. (1987).
Dimensions of thought flow in
everyday life. Imag. Cogn. Pers. 7,
105–128. doi: 10.2190/7K24-G343-
MTQW-115V
Liberman, N., and Trope, Y.
(2008). The psychology of tran-
scending the here and now.
Science 322, 1201–1205. doi:
10.1126/science.1161958
Lutz, A., and Thompson, E. (2003).
Neurophenomenology: integrating
subjective experience and brain
dynamics in the neuroscience of
consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud.
10, 31–52.
Macleod, A. K., and Byrne, A. (1996).
Anxiety, depression, and the antici-
pation of future positive and nega-
tive experiences. J. Abnorm. Psychol.
105, 286–289. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.105.2.286
Marchetti, I., Koster, E. H., and De
Raedt, R. (2012). Mindwandering
heightens the accessibility of neg-
ative relative to positive thought.
Conscious. Cogn. 21, 1517–1525.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.05.013
McVay, J. C., and Kane, M. J. (2009).
Conducting the train of thought:
working memory capacity, goal
neglect, and mind wandering in
an executive-control task. J. Exp.
Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 35,
196–204. doi: 10.1037/a0014104
McVay, J. C., and Kane, M. J. (2010).
“Adrift in the stream of thought: the
effects of mind wandering on exec-
utive control and working memory
capacity,” in Handbook of Individual
Differences in Cognition: Attention,
Memory, and Executive Control, eds
A. Gruszka, G. Matthews, and B.
Szymura (New York, NY: Springer),
321–334.
McVay, J. C., and Kane, M. J. (2012).
Drifting from slow to “d’oh!”: work-
ing memory capacity and mind
wandering predict extreme reaction
times and executive control errors.
J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn.
38, 525–549. doi: 10.1037/a0025896
Mooneyham, B. W., and Schooler, J.
W. (2013). The costs and bene-
fits of mind-wandering: a review.
Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 67, 11–18. doi:
10.1037/a0031569
Morin, A., Uttl, B., and Hamper,
B. (2011). Self-reported fre-
quency, content, and functions
of inner speech. Proc. Soc.
Behav. Sci. 30, 1714–1718. doi:
10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.10.331
Muthén, B. O. (1994). Multilevel
covariance structure analysis. Soc.
Methods Res. 22, 376–398. doi:
10.1177/0049124194022003006
Muthén, L. K., and Muthén, B. O.
(1998-2010). Mplus User’s Guide,
6th Edn. Los Angeles, CA: Muthén
& Muthén.
Rasbash, J., Charlton, C., Browne, W.
J., Healy, M., and Cameron, B.
(2009). MLwiN Version 2.1. Centre
for Multilevel Modelling, University
of Bristol.
Rasmussen, A. S., and Berntsen, D.
(2013). The reality of the past ver-
sus the ideality of the future: emo-
tional valence and functional dif-
ferences between past and future
mental time travel. Mem. Cogn. 41,
187–200. doi: 10.3758/s13421-012-
0260-y
Reise, S. P., Ventura, J., Nuechterlein,
K. H., and Kim, K. H. (2005). An
illustration of multilevel factor anal-
ysis. J. Pers. Assess. 84, 126–136. doi:
10.1207/s15327752jpa8402_02
Robertson, I. H., Manly, T., Andrade,
J., Baddeley, B. T., and Yiend, J.
(1997). ‘Oops!’: performance cor-
relates of everyday attentional fail-
ures in traumatic brain injured and
normal subjects. Neuropsychologia
35, 747–758. doi: 10.1016/S0028-
3932(97)00015-8
Roese, N. J., and Sherman, J. W. (2007).
“Expectancies,” in Social Psychology:
Handbook of Basic Principles, 2nd
Edn., eds E. T. Higgins and A. W.
Kruglanski (New York, NY: Guilford
Press), 91–115.
Rudrauf, D., Lutz, A., Cosmelli, D.,
Lachaux, J. P., and Le Van Quyen,
M. (2003). From autopoiesis to
neurophenomenology: Francisco
Varela’s exploration of the bio-
physics of being. Biol. Res.
36, 27–65. doi: 10.4067/S0716-
97602003000100005
Schooler, J. W., Smallwood, J.,
Christoff, K., Handy, T. C., Reichle,
E. D., and Sayette, M. A. (2011).
Meta-awareness, perceptual decou-
pling and the wandering mind.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 319–326.
Singer, J. L. (1993). Experimental stud-
ies of ongoing conscious expe-
rience. Ciba Found. Symp. 174,
100–122.
Smallwood, J. (2010). Why the global
availability of mind wandering
necessitates resource competition:
reply to McVay and Kane (2010).
Psychol. Bull. 136, 202–207. doi:
10.1037/a0018673
Smallwood, J. (2011). Mind-wandering
while reading: attentional decou-
pling, mindless reading and the
cascade model of inattention. Lang.
Linguist. Comp. 5, 63–77. doi:
10.1111/j.1749-818X.2010.00263.x
Smallwood, J. (2013). Distinguishing
how from why the mind wanders:
a process-occurrence framework
for self-generated mental activity.
Psychol. Bull. 139, 519–535. doi:
10.1037/a0030010
Smallwood, J., Brown, K., Baird,
B., and Schooler, J. W. (2012).
Cooperation between the default
mode network and the frontal-
parietal network in the pro-
duction of an internal train
of thought. Brain Res. 1428,
60–70. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.
2011.03.072
Smallwood, J., Fishman, D. J., and
Schooler, J. W. (2007). Counting the
cost of an absent mind: mind wan-
dering as an underrecognized influ-
ence on educational performance.
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 14, 230–236. doi:
10.3758/BF03194057
Smallwood, J., Nind, L., and O’Connor,
R. C. (2009). When is your head at?
An exploration of the factors associ-
ated with the temporal focus of the
wandering mind. Conscious. Cogn.
18, 118–125. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
2008.11.004
Smallwood, J., and Schooler, J.
W. (2006). The restless mind.
Psychol. Bull. 132, 946–958. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.946
Smallwood, J., Schooler, J. W., Turk, D.
J., Cunningham, S. J., Burns, P., and
Macrae, C. N. (2011). Self-reflection
and the temporal focus of the wan-
dering mind. Conscious. Cogn. 20,
1120–1126. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.
2010.12.017
Song, X., and Wang, X. (2012). Mind
wandering in Chinese daily lives -
an experience sampling study. PLoS
ONE 7:e44423. doi: 10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0044423
Spreng, R. N., Stevens, W. D.,
Chamberlain, J. P., Gilmore, A. W.,
and Schacter, D. L. (2010). Default
network activity, coupled with the
frontoparietal control network,
supports goal-directed cognition.
Neuroimage 53, 303–317. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.06.016
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 425 | 11
Stawarczyk et al. Phenomenology of future-oriented mind-wandering
Stawarczyk, D., Majerus, S., Maj,
M., Van Der Linden, M., and
D’Argembeau, A. (2011a).
Mind-wandering: phenomenol-
ogy and function as assessed
with a novel experience sam-
pling method. Acta Psychol. 136,
370–381. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.
01.002
Stawarczyk, D., Majerus, S.,
Maquet, P., and D’Argembeau,
A. (2011b). Neural correlates
of ongoing conscious experi-
ence: both task-unrelatedness
and stimulus-independence are
related to default network activ-
ity. PLoS ONE 6:e16997. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0016997
Stuyven, E., and Van Der Goten,
K. (1995). Stimulus independent
thoughts and working memory: the
role of the central executive. Psychol.
Belgica 35, 241–251.
Teasdale, J. D., Proctor, L., Lloyd, C.
A., and Baddeley, A. D. (1993).
Working memory and stimulus-
independent thought: effects of
memory load and presentation
rate. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 5,
417–433. doi: 10.1080/095414493
08520128
Watkins, E. R. (2008). Constructive
and unconstructive repetitive
thought. Psychol. Bull. 134,
163–206. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.
134.2.163
Watkins, E. R. (2010). Level of con-
strual, mind wandering, and
repetitive thought: reply to McVay
and Kane (2010). Psychol. Bull. 136,
198–201. doi: 10.1037/a0018563
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 21 May 2013; paper pend-
ing published: 01 June 2013; accepted:
21 June 2013; published online: 16 July
2013.
Citation: Stawarczyk D, Cassol H and
D’Argembeau A (2013) Phenomenology
of future-oriented mind-wandering
episodes. Front. Psychol. 4:425. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00425
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Perception Science, a specialty of
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Stawarczyk, Cassol
and D’Argembeau. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in other forums, pro-
vided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 425 | 12
